Every cloud storage provider is a potential source of evidence. That is not a controversial claim — it is written into the terms of service of every major platform, and it is the reason governments issue subpoenas rather than having to break into devices. What most people have not done is look at how often it actually happens.
Microsoft publishes a Law Enforcement Requests Report on a semi-annual basis. The most recent data covers July to December 2025. It is one of the most detailed transparency disclosures of any major tech company, and it is worth reading if you store personal files — photos, documents, emails — in any Microsoft product.
The Numbers From Microsoft’s Own Report
In the second half of 2025, Microsoft received 27,412 law enforcement requests across all its consumer services. That includes OneDrive, Outlook, Xbox, and other platforms.
Of those requests, roughly 20% were rejected entirely — Microsoft determined they did not meet its legal standards.
The remaining 80% resulted in some form of response. Most responses involved non-content disclosures: subscriber information and account metadata such as a name, an email address, a device ID, or an IP address. This type of information was disclosed in the majority of compliant responses.
In approximately 5% of total requests — which works out to roughly 1,400 cases — Microsoft disclosed actual content. Content means the files themselves: emails you sent, documents you stored, photos you uploaded.
That is 1,400 times in six months that someone’s actual files moved from Microsoft’s servers to a law enforcement agency.
What “Content Disclosure” Actually Means
When transparency reports refer to content, they mean your data in its readable form — not just evidence that you have an account, but the material inside it.
For OneDrive users, that means a government agency with a valid legal order could receive:
- The photos you backed up from your phone
- The documents you stored privately
- Files you shared with others or kept to yourself
- Videos, voice notes, scanned receipts, anything else in the drive
Microsoft does not hand these over without a legal basis. The report notes that the company rejects requests it determines do not meet legal standards, and it occasionally challenges requests in court. There are genuine guardrails.
But a valid legal basis is available for a wide range of circumstances. A search warrant in a criminal investigation is the obvious case. A civil lawsuit discovery request is another. A government agency with national security authority operates under different — often less transparent — legal standards.
Microsoft is also required in many jurisdictions to keep the legal request confidential, which means users are sometimes not informed that their files have been accessed.
The U.S. Numbers Specifically
For users in the United States, the report breaks down the numbers further. Microsoft received 5,587 legal demands for consumer account data from U.S. law enforcement in the six-month period. A subset of those — 115 warrants — sought content data that was physically stored outside the United States.
The cross-border dimension matters. A warrant issued in one country can reach files stored in a data centre located in another, depending on the laws involved and the provider’s operating structure. For U.S. users, files stored in U.S. Microsoft data centres are subject to U.S. law. But Microsoft operates infrastructure in many countries, and data routing can affect which legal regime applies.
How This Compares to Other Providers
Every major cloud provider publishes similar transparency reports: Google, Apple, Meta, Dropbox, and others. The numbers vary significantly, and direct comparisons are complicated by differences in how each company counts and categorises requests.
What the reports share is the confirmation that law enforcement access to cloud-stored personal files is routine — not an edge case. It happens thousands of times per reporting period, across every major platform.
The reports also confirm that providers do push back. Rejection rates vary by company, but all of them decline some requests. Microsoft’s 20% rejection rate represents thousands of requests it refused to comply with. That is not nothing.
What the Transparency Report Does Not Tell You
The reports describe aggregate numbers but not individual cases. You cannot look up whether your account has been subject to a request. You do not receive notification unless the company is legally permitted to provide it — and in many cases, it is not.
The reports also describe the legal requests that come through official channels. They do not address what happens if an employee with authorised access to systems acts improperly, or what intelligence agency access looks like under classified programmes that do not appear in public transparency counts.
Practical Steps If This Concerns You
Use services that limit the content they can access. If content is encrypted end-to-end before reaching a provider’s servers — true zero-knowledge encryption — a valid law enforcement request to that provider yields encrypted data that is useless without your key. Microsoft OneDrive does not offer end-to-end encryption. Neither does iCloud unless you enable Advanced Data Protection.
Know where your sensitive files actually live. “The cloud” is not a homogeneous jurisdiction. Different providers store in different regions, respond to different legal orders, and disclose to different governments at different rates. Knowing which country’s infrastructure holds your data is the first step in understanding your legal exposure.
Read the transparency report. Microsoft’s Law Enforcement Requests Report is published at microsoft.com and updated every six months. Reading it takes about fifteen minutes. Most people who store files in OneDrive have never looked at it.
Tier your storage by sensitivity. Not all files carry the same personal or legal significance. Photos from a family holiday are different from documents related to a legal matter, a health condition, or a financial situation. Treating all of them as equally suitable for standard cloud storage is a convenience decision, not a privacy decision.
The Role of Encryption in This Picture
Encryption does not stop law enforcement requests — it limits what a provider can hand over. If files are encrypted in a way that means the provider does not hold the decryption key, a request to the provider yields ciphertext. Whether that data is useful depends on whether the requesting authority can separately obtain the key.
True end-to-end encryption moves the legal target from the provider to the device or key holder. It is more protection, but it comes with tradeoffs — lost access if keys are lost, limited ability for the provider to help with account recovery.
Server-side encryption, which is what most mainstream cloud providers use (including daftei), protects your files from being read by the provider’s own staff in routine operations and from being exposed in many breach scenarios. It does not provide protection against a valid legal request, because the provider holds the key.
daftei uses AES-256 encryption at rest and TLS 1.3 in transit. It is transparent about the fact that this is server-side encryption, not end-to-end encryption. It is GDPR and CCPA compliant, never sells data, never shows ads, and never uses content to train AI models. Like all providers subject to applicable law, it is required to respond to valid legal orders — but its business model does not depend on monetising user data in any other way.
Understanding the difference between server-side and end-to-end encryption, and deciding how much of each you need for which files, is the central practical privacy question for personal cloud storage.
A Transparent Picture Is Better Than an Invisible One
Microsoft’s transparency report is, on balance, good for users. It provides actual numbers. It shows that the company pushes back on requests it considers invalid. It gives researchers and journalists the data to hold the company accountable.
The alternative — a provider that receives no requests, or receives them and discloses nothing about it — is harder to reason about, not safer.
What the report confirms is that personal cloud storage is not a private safe. It is a service provided by a company operating under legal jurisdiction, with obligations to respond to lawful government requests for its users’ data. Understanding that clearly is more useful than being surprised by it.