In early November of this year, Bloomberg published an investigation into a system called Webloc — a commercial location intelligence platform that law enforcement agencies across the United States have been quietly using to track hundreds of millions of phones, without warrants, without notifying the people being tracked, and without any apparent awareness that the individuals concerned had any role in enabling it.
The mechanism is a familiar one: advertising SDKs embedded in free apps. But what’s newly documented in the Webloc reporting — and in parallel research from Citizen Lab — is the scale and the recipient. This isn’t just about data brokers selling location histories to marketers. It’s about law enforcement gaining real-time access to a surveillance infrastructure that most smartphone users are unknowingly funding with their free downloads.
How Location Data Flows from Your Phone to a Police Dashboard
The chain starts with an app — a weather app, a fitness tracker, a game, a retail coupon app — that includes a third-party advertising SDK to monetize its user base. When that app requests location permission (or when you’ve already granted it), the SDK uses that permission to record your precise GPS coordinates at regular intervals.
Those coordinates, along with your device’s advertising identifier, are packaged and sent to the data broker’s servers. At scale, the broker aggregates this data from thousands of apps, assembling what becomes a persistent, timestamped movement history for each device in its database.
Historically, that database has been sold to advertisers, analytics companies, and hedge funds looking for behavioral signals. What Citizen Lab documented in its analysis of Webloc is that the same data pipeline — with no technical modification — also sells access to law enforcement. Agencies including ICE, CBP, and multiple city police departments have reportedly used Webloc’s interface to query the location history of a device, search for all devices present in a particular area at a particular time, and identify patterns of movement that connect a device to places or events.
None of this requires a warrant in most U.S. jurisdictions, because courts have held that data voluntarily shared with a third party (which the data broker claims it is) is not subject to Fourth Amendment protections. The person who downloaded the weather app did not “voluntarily” share their precise GPS history with law enforcement. But legally, the argument is that they shared it with the ad network, and the ad network sold it.
Webloc and the Scale of the Surveillance Infrastructure
Citizen Lab’s analysis estimated that Webloc can monitor up to 500 million mobile devices in real time. That figure encompasses devices globally, but the U.S. share is substantial, given the density of ad-supported app usage in the American market.
The data doesn’t come exclusively from GPS. Real-time bidding auctions — the millisecond-level ad auctions that run every time a web page or app screen loads — also broadcast location data to dozens of competing bidders. Each bidder receives a device identifier and an approximate location, ostensibly for targeting a single ad impression. In practice, those impressions are logged, retained, and aggregated by companies operating in the ad-tech supply chain.
The EFF documented a related problem in an August 2026 report: advertising SDKs embedded in apps can automatically feed users’ location data into ad systems at collection intervals far more frequent than users realize, often every few minutes when the app is active. The EFF found that in many cases, the app developer was not fully aware of how frequently the SDK was collecting, because the SDK operated under its own configuration rather than the developer’s.
The Specific Policing Use Cases That Have Been Documented
The Tucson case cited in the Citizen Lab reporting gives a concrete picture of how this works in practice. Officers investigating a series of robberies pulled up Webloc’s mapping interface, queried all devices present in the vicinity of each crime, and noticed one device that appeared at multiple locations across multiple incidents. They followed the location trail to the device’s home address.
This is what investigators call “geofencing” — not the kind that requires a court order directed at Google (which Google has now been legally ordered to stop complying with in certain states), but the kind that happens when an agency has standing access to a commercial location database and runs its own queries without any external oversight.
The Fog Reveal tool, a predecessor to Webloc in the law enforcement location-data market, was documented earlier as providing city police departments with what advocacy groups called “mass surveillance on a budget” — contracts reportedly as low as $7,500 per year for access to location histories tied to advertising identifiers.
What CBP (Customs and Border Protection) used in a March 2026 investigation was described in reporting as “commercially available marketing location data from the online ad ecosystem” — the precise same pipeline, applied at the border to track phone movements.
Which Apps Are Most Likely to Have SDKs That Feed This Pipeline
There is no public, comprehensive list of which apps include SDKs that feed into Webloc or similar location intelligence platforms. The data broker contracts are not public. SDK licensing agreements are not disclosed to end users. App Store privacy labels show aggregate categories (“precise location used for tracking”) but not which specific third party receives the data.
What you can infer from prior reporting, the FTC’s Kochava case, and the EFF’s SDK audits:
High-risk categories:
- Free weather apps that need location to function but generate revenue through ads
- Free games with integrated advertising networks
- Retail apps that offer coupons or loyalty rewards tied to location
- Free flashlight, scanner, and utility apps that have no obvious monetization model except advertising
- Free navigation or mapping apps that aren’t operated by the device manufacturer
Lower-risk categories:
- Apps for which you are paying a subscription and that have an explicit privacy policy stating no location data is shared with third parties
- First-party device apps from Apple or Google (which have their own privacy concerns but are under greater regulatory and media scrutiny)
- Open-source apps that have been audited
The absence of ads is a reasonable — though not definitive — proxy for the absence of advertising SDKs. An app that charges you is less likely to need to monetize your location data, because you are the revenue source rather than the ad network.
The Warrant-Requirement Gap
The legal framework around location data purchased from commercial brokers is inconsistent and contested.
The Supreme Court’s 2018 Carpenter v. United States decision held that cell-site location data (the towers your phone connects to) requires a warrant, because the records are detailed enough to reveal the privacies of life. Many civil liberties organizations argue that the same reasoning should apply to GPS-precise location data assembled from advertising SDKs — it is more detailed than cell-tower data, not less.
Courts have not uniformly agreed. Several have held that because the data was disclosed to a commercial third party, the third-party doctrine applies and no warrant is required. Congressional efforts to restrict law enforcement purchases of commercial location data have stalled.
What this means in practice is that the legal protection is behind the technological reality. Law enforcement has access to location intelligence tools that exceed the precision and retention of anything that existed when Fourth Amendment case law was established, and the legal framework has not caught up.
What You Can Do
The most effective single action is to revoke precise location permissions from apps that don’t genuinely require them.
On iPhone: Go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Location Services. For each app, evaluate whether it has a legitimate functional reason to know your precise GPS location. Navigation apps do. Weather apps can function with a city-level approximation. Games, retail, and utilities almost never need precise location. Where you can’t revoke entirely, turn off “Precise Location” to give the app an approximate region rather than GPS coordinates.
Also disable Allow Apps to Request to Track under Settings → Privacy & Security → Tracking. This prevents apps from reading your Advertising Identifier (IDFA), which is the persistent device-level identifier that allows location histories from different apps to be merged into a single profile.
On Android: Settings → Privacy → Permission Manager → Location. Set apps to “Allow only while using” at most; “Don’t allow” for anything that doesn’t require location to work. Grant “Approximate location” rather than “Precise location” wherever Android gives you that option.
On both platforms: Review the privacy labels on new apps before installing. An app that lists “precise location” under “Data Used to Track You” is specifically disclosing participation in cross-app advertising tracking. That’s the disclosure that connects to data broker pipelines of the kind Webloc uses.
Why Storage Apps Are Different
The data flowing out of your phone through advertising SDKs is a function of the apps you use to consume free content and services. Apps designed primarily for private storage — where there’s no advertising model, no third-party SDK dependency for monetization, and no business reason to harvest location data — sit outside this pipeline by design.
daftei is GDPR and CCPA compliant, never shows ads, and never sells user data. There’s no advertising SDK in the app, because there’s no advertising model to build one for. Your files and memories stay where you put them — on daftei’s servers under AES-256 encryption at rest and TLS 1.3 in transit — without being fed into the data broker supply chain that the Webloc reporting has made visible.
The broader point is simpler: the apps most likely to be feeding location data into law enforcement surveillance pipelines are free apps built on advertising. The apps that charge for a service, or that are explicitly privacy-first, have fundamentally different incentive structures. That doesn’t make them immune to privacy failures, but it removes the specific mechanism — the advertising SDK — that makes the Webloc pipeline possible.